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Abstract 
EU public procurement law identifies competitive tendering as the primary instrument 
for the selection of operators in the water sector. However, the merits of competition 
for the market are highly contested in the literature and theoretical debate. This paper 
looks at empirical evidence from Italy and assesses the implications of competitive 
tendering on “good governance”, with particular reference to efficiency, transparency 
and accountability. We draw on the policy networks tradition to capture the 
interdependency of actors’ interests, actors’ resources and applicable rules. Our 
analytical framework allows us to identify the structural limitations of competitive 
tendering and the associated regulation by contract. More precisely, we observe the 
combined effect of resource allocation (in terms of asymmetry of knowledge and 
power) and the nature of the applicable rules (e.g. ex-ante regulation and long term 
contracts). This allows for interest-seeking behaviour during both the tendering 
procedure and the execution of the contract. In turn, opportunistic behaviour 
undermines the achievement of both governance and reform objectives. Finally, we 
posit that introducing stronger transparency, accountability and participatory 
mechanisms would align actors’ interests to intended reform objectives. We put 
forward the following hypothesis for further empirical testing. The strengthening of 
governance requires the creation of opportunities for: a) involving civil society in 
decision making and the monitoring of operations; b) investing in the knowledge of 
actors participating in decision making and monitoring; c) sanctioning behaviour 
unaligned with reform objectives through simple and effective rules. 
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1. Introduction 
This article addresses the impact of EU public procurement law on the governance of 
water supply and sanitation. It does so by looking at the reform of the institutional 
framework underlying water service operations in Italy, the reform of which has 
resulted in protracted conflicts between the European Commission and Italian 
authorities due to alleged breach of EU competition law. Furthermore, the observation 
of Italian experience with resort to competitive tendering for the selection of private 
water and wastewater operators allows for testing the validity of theoretical 
perspectives informing the introduction of competition at sectoral level. 
The technical characteristics of water supply and sanitation delivery affect their 
organisation and regulation. As a result of technological constraints, water services 
are regarded as typical natural monopolies. This implies that the prevalent form of 
competition in the sector consists in the selection of operators via tendering 
procedures, whereby the successful bidder enters into a long term contract for the 
exclusive right to provide the service. This is known as Demsetz competition, from 
the author who first elaborated on it (Demsetz, 1968), or competition for the market, 
as opposed to competition in the market. Demsetz competition is usually associated 
with regulation by contract, as the conceding public authorities assume the 
responsibility for monitoring operational performance in light of contractual targets 
and standards1. A substantial body of literature contends that competition for the 
market, regulation and elaborate contracts entered into by private operators would 
mimic efficiency-driving competition in the market (Braadbaart, 2001: 6). 
To date no EU directive has liberalised the water sector, contrary to other public 
services or Services of General Economic Interest. However, the jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Justice identifies the conditions under which local authorities have 
the obligation to competitively appoint an operator. Such criteria are inspired by the 
proposed construction of the EU internal market and, to that effect, de facto promote 
the predominance of competition for the market over other appointment procedures. 
They result in increasing restrictions for the legal provision of in-house, public water 
operations.  
This article first investigates the effectiveness of Demsetz competition and regulation 
by contract in achieving good governance in the water sector. In order to do so, we 
observe the strategic games entered into by different actors around the procedure 
leading to the competitive award of concessions. Furthermore, we examine interest-
seeking practices unfolding during the conduction of operations under regulatory 
scrutiny. The article then addresses the merits of competition for the market in water 
supply and sanitation, specifically considering whether this is conducive to good 
governance. 
The case studies selected depict a variety of experiences with the competitive award 
of contracts. This ranges from bidding for the construction, financing and operation of 
two major wastewater treatment plants in Milan to the appointment of private water 
supply and sanitation operators in Arezzo and Latina. Arezzo represents the longest-
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running case of private operations since the 1994 reform of the Italian water sector 
and provides a useful setting for the observation of interaction between actors under 
regulation by contract. Among the tenders held for the selection of water supply and 
sanitation operators after the 1994 reform that of Latina has to date attracted the 
highest number of bidders. This allows us to separately evaluate the effects of the 
competitiveness of the procedure from other intervening factors. Empirical evidence 
has been primarily obtained via the EU-funded research project WaterTime2, and 
complemented by data gathered through the PSIRU global database on the effects of 
public service reform3 and the database of the Italian Forum of Movements on 
Water4. 
In the next section we develop an analytical framework drawing on relevant 
theoretical perspectives. We then illustrate EU public procurement law as applicable 
to the water sector in member countries, sectoral reforms introduced in Italy in the last 
15 years and the disputes between the European Commission and the Italian 
government that ensued. Moving from such premises, a fifth section is devoted to 
presenting the experiences with competitive bidding for the selection of water supply 
and/or sanitation operators in Milan, Arezzo and Latina. A final section discusses 
findings and puts forward conclusions, considering both the theoretical and policy 
implications of our analysis. 
2. Analytical framework and relevant theoretical perspectives 
Even the most fervert proponents of competition in the water sector acknowledge that 
competition is not an end in itself and that is rather aimed at enhancing efficiency 
(WRc and Ecologic, 2002: 36). In this article, we observe the impact of competition 
for the market, and some of the public-private partnerships (PPPs) that are associated 
with its introduction, on water service governance. Governance refers to: the process 
and outcome of institutional reform; the role of public, private and social actors; and 
their economic, but also political and institutional, social and environmental 
implications (Green, 2007: 2-9). It thus provides a comprehensive setting against 
which to judge the results of competition and interpret how this is affected by a 
variety of factors. In turn, we use policy networks as an analytical framework to 
gather insights on the roles of different actors, and the formal and informal rules 
which governance incapsulates. This enables us to address the complexity of 
institutional reforms such as the competitive appointment of private water operators, 
overcoming the limitations of static economic models chiefly concerned with price 
levels as recorded immediately after the award of concessions (Lobina and Hall, 
2003; Lobina and Hall, 2007).   
2.1. Water service governance 
Rogers and Hall (2003: 7) refer to water service governance as the range of political, 
social, economic and administrative systems that are in place to develop and manage 
the delivery of water services. Castro (2007: 761) elaborates further on the concept of 
governance as emerging from mainstream literature. This consists of the interaction 
between different management regimes: state authority (hierarchy), private 
management (market competition), and civil society (voluntary participation). 
Among the preconditions to good or effective governance in water service provision, 
Rogers and Hall (2003: 9, 27-29) identify inclusiveness, predictability, accountability, 
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transparency, participation, equity and ethics, coherence, efficiency, responsiveness 
and sustainability. These principles provide a framework for the evaluation of 
governance resulting of the reform of water services, including the selection of 
operators via competitive bidding. 
Green (2007: 2-9) identifies three dimensions of water governance: a) the process and 
outcome of institutional reform; b) the role of public, private and social actors; and, c) 
the economic, but also political and institutional, social and environmental 
implications of the first two dimensions. The preconditions to good governance refer 
to both the process and outcome of institutional reform. Among those, however, 
sustainability is the guiding principle informing governance. 
The most popular definition of sustainability, provided by the World Commission on 
Environment and Development in 1987, is "development that meets the needs of the 
present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own 
needs." The needs addressed by development according to the concept of 
sustainability are multiform and are captured by the acronym PESTE: Political and 
institutional; Economic; Social; Technical; and, Environmental (ERL-UCM and 
PSIRU, 2003). PESTE sustainability thus coincides with Green’s (2007) third 
dimension of governance. 
Green (2007: 2) observes that mainstream definitions of governance, for example that 
provided by UNDP (1997), correspond to Aristotle’s notion of politics. It is thus 
possible to redefine governance as decision making in a multi-polar, fragmented 
society, aimed at enhancing sustainability. 
For the purposes of our analysis, the distinction between internal and external water 
governance is particularly significant. The former refers to the “functions, balances 
and structures internal to the water sector”, including legal agreements governing 
property rights. The latter extends the concept to embrace the influence of civil 
society and political actors on the management of water services (Rogers and Hall, 
2003: 16-17). In that sense, Hall et al. (2007: 154, 156, 158) emphasise the 
importance of public participation and transparency in strengthening the 
democratisation, coherence and responsiveness of decision making on water sector 
reform. 
2.2. Theoretical foundations of competition in the water sector 
Demsetz (1968) is regarded as the first contribution on competition for the market as a 
surrogate for competition in the market. This concept relies on the assumption that 
sufficient ex-ante competition, for example in terms of the number of bidders, would 
result in enhanced operational efficiency. 
In that sense, Cabral (2000: 137) infers from bargaining theory and anecdotal 
evidence that the higher the number of bidders the lower the probability of collusive 
behaviour among the participants in a tendering procedure. In addition, Williamson 
(1976) points to the completeness of contractual specifications as a requirement for 
successful competition for the market. Operational efficiency would thus be a 
function of contract design, as the bidder committing to supply the service at the more 
favourable conditions would be awarded the contract (Baron and Myerson, 1982; 
Riordan and Sappington, 1987). 
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Baldwin and Cave (1999: 258) argue that the competitive selection of service 
operators “provides a means of … inducing monopolists to behave as if subject to 
competitive pressures … It offers an effective sanction for poor performance, namely 
the threat of (contract) termination, suspension, or non-renewal and it reduces the 
dangers of regulatory capture by minimising agency discretion”. 
On the other hand, Sappington and Stiglitz (1987) suggest that the expected benefits 
of competition for the market might not realise as firms are adverse to risk and 
competition for the service concession is limited. Furthermore, there are difficulties in 
designing contracts and anticipating all possible contingencies, and these constraints 
imply limits on the liability of producers and limited commitment on the part of 
government. Goldberg (1976) also elaborates on contract failure as a limitation of 
franchise bidding. Finally, problems with contract implementation are likely to 
originate because of difficulties in measuring performance and obstacles derived from 
complicated hierarchies of control (Sappington and Stiglitz, 1987). 
Demsetz’ (1968) work found ample resonance among the doctrine interested in the 
reform of water services and still informs the position of the European Commission 
on competition in the sector. Rees (1998: 18-20) argues that competition for the 
market per se will not necessarily result in the enhanced efficiency of what remain 
monopolistic operators, unless this is accompanied by regulatory scrutiny including 
regulation by contract. Regulation by contract would serve the twofold purpose of 
minimising regulatory risk faced by private operators and atracting the highest 
number of bidders thus enhancing the effectiveness of competition for the market. 
“Highly specific contract terms, setting out duties, performance targets, water price 
uprating rules, and dispute arbitration procedures, allow the companies to better 
predict the profitability of the venture and decide what it is worth paying to win the 
contract. Such contracts may also be advantageous for governments in that more 
bidders could be attracted and a better deal struck” (Rees, 1998: 29-30). In summary, 
regulation and competition would be mutually reinforcing as regulation is supposed to 
compensate for the limited etent of competition in the sector, while competitive 
pressures would reduce the required regulatory burden (Rees, 1998: 4). 
Similar perspectives on competition, regulation and PPPs in the water sector are 
embraced by Franceys (2000) and Lorrain (1997c) to cite but a few. They also find 
echoes in WRc and Ecologic (2002: 53-56), and appear to inform European 
Commission’s position on competition in the water sector illustrated by Gee (2008). 
As noted by Hall (2003: 3), WRc and Ecologic (2002: 53, 94) acknowledge that “The 
key test to the successful implementation of competition pressures in these areas is the 
degree of ‘contestability’ that exists for each contract and the processes that ensure 
transparency and opportunity and that deal with concerns related to incumbent 
advantage and possible collusion”. However, they fail to elaborate on the extent to 
which the identified factors affect the suitability of competition in practice.      
Furthermore, Lobina and Hall (2003) show that the success of competitive bidding 
cannot be judged on the contractual conditions valid at the moment of the award. 
Concessions are in fact subject to renegotiations which often alter the content of the 
original agreement. In order to interpret the complex interaction among different 
stakeholders prior to and after the award of a long term concession, we refer to the 
policy networks tradition. It is possible to identify two phases, one leading to the 
award of the contract and the other starting with the inception of operations, on which 
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depends the effectiveness of Demsetz competition and regulation by contract in the 
water sector. This can be evaluated in light of the attributes of governance. For 
example, the predictability of the rules governing the bidding is often emphasised by 
operators and observers of competition issues. Also, the results of competition and 
regulation are often assessed in terms of efficiency. Focussed on actors’ interests, 
resources and the underlying rules, policy networks represent a valid framework to 
support explanations of divergence from expected outcomes of institutional reform. 
2.3. Policy networks as an analytical framework for the investigation of strategic 
behaviour 
Much literature explores governance through the lens of social and policy networks. 
Governance is in fact a multi-actor process based on interaction in a context of 
fragmented interests. Adopting a networks approach to the investigation of 
governance allows for reconciling and going beyond the apparent dichotomy between 
agency and structure. In fact, networks do not exist in a vacuum and both their origin 
and evolution are a result of the interdependence between agency and structure 
(Lobina et al., 2009). 
Klijn and Koppenjan (2006: 144) define networks as “patterns of social relationships 
between mutually dependent actors”. These relationships are formed around policy 
problems or policy programmes (Klijn, 1997: 30), thus including the award of a water 
concession or operating contract and the supervision of operations. Actors 
strategically interact in pursuit of their own interests and objectives and such 
interaction is informed by the respectively available resources and the context which 
shapes the relationships. Resources include powers, status, legitimacy, knowledge and 
money. In turn, one actor’s power is given by the perception other actors have of his 
or her power (Klijn et al., 1995: 439-441). Context includes rules informing actors’ 
engagement in the network, but also the technology which defines the limits of policy 
making and decision making (compare De Bruijn and Dicke, 2006: 721 on the 
interdependency between public values and technical infrastructure). Finally, relations 
can be characterised as transactional or conflicting. In the first case, actors exchange 
resources for the achievement of common objectives. In the latter, resources are 
deployed for the attainment of divergent goals which generate antagonism (Hermans 
and Timmermans, 2001). 
Lobina and Hall’s (2003) empirical investigation of post-award dynamic interest-
seeking behaviour by private water operators is guided by policy networks. They thus 
explain the divergence between the expected benefits and the outcome of private 
sector participation (PSP), irrespective of resort to competition for the market and the 
content of contractual provisions. Lobina and Hall (2007) adopt policy networks as an 
analytical framework to illustrate the power games between public and private actors 
under regulation by contract. In so doing, they observe interaction among 
stakeholders in terms of principal-agent relationships. For the purposes of our 
analysis, we use policy networks as an analytical framework to test the cogency of 
theoretical perspectives on Demsetz competition in the water sector. 
First, we refer to the process of network structuring (Klijn et al., 1995: 442) to derive 
insights on the strategic games which take place around bidding procedures. It is in 
this phase that local authorities, acting as network managers, decide which actors can 
access the network by selecting the service provider among the bidders. The strategic 
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importance of this decision, resulting in long term access to a captive market, might 
induce strategic behaviour. 
Conversely, the concept of game management is instrumental to investigating 
interactions between regulator and regulated operator during the course of the 
concession. Games are series of actions occurring between different actors in light of 
formal and informal rules (Klijn et al., 1995: 439-442). This perspective allows for 
evaluating the extent to which formal rules such as contractual provisions are 
adequate to inform the behaviour of operators. 
Finally, the impact of EU competition policy on water service governance is observed 
through the lens of the categories identified by Klijn and Koppenjan (2006: 149-154) 
to study institutional design. They argue that the strategies for institutional reform can 
be aimed at affecting network composition, network outcomes and network 
interactions. For example, network composition can be changed via rules governing 
access to games. Strategies aimed at network outcomes are represented by 
modification of evaluation criteria for the judgment of achieved outcomes. Network 
interactions are affected by rules governing supervisory relationships and conflict, 
such as adjudication procedures in case of dispute. This approach enables a more 
accurate analysis of the impact of EU competition policy on water service 
governance. This analysis can in fact be conducted in view of policy correspondence 
with the principles of good governance, and in consideration of the alternative 
strategies available to achieve the intended objectives. 
3. EU competition law and the water sector 
To date no EU directive has liberalised the water sector, for example by providing for 
competition in the market or the freedom of operators to offer their services to any 
customer. This is also unlikely to occur due to the high fixed costs associated with 
distribution and the high costs of transporting water over long distances, which would 
contain the economic impact of liberalisation (Gee, 2008: 8, 12). 
No European directive disciplines the granting or award to public or private 
undertakings of the right to operate water services, either in the form of concessions 
or other special or exclusive rights (WRc and Ecologic, 2002: 15-16). In other words, 
no directive determines how local authorities should grant or award water services to 
public operators or private companies. 
The Court of Justice of the European Communities (ECJ) has ruled, in the judgment 
Commission v. France, that those contracts excluded from the scope of public 
procurement directives should nonetheless be subject to the fundamental rules of the 
Treaty of the European Communities (now renamed Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union, henceforth the Treaty), and particularly the principle of non-
discrimination on grounds of nationality5. In the Teleaustria case, the ECJ clarified 
that concession contracts falling outside the scope of public procurement directives 
should nonetheless be granted or awarded in compliance “with the fundamental rules 
of the treaty, in general, and the principle of non-discrimination on the ground of 
nationality, in particular”6. 
Even in the absence of a specific directive, the award of water concessions should 
thus be subject to the principles enshrined in the rules of the Treaty and to the 
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principles identified by European case-law. Relevant principles emanating from the 
Treaty include the principles of equality of treatment, transparency, non-
discrimination, mutual recognition and proportionality (WRc and Ecologic, 2002: 15, 
67-69). Furthermore, ECJ jurisprudence has identified the conditions under which 
local authorities have the obligation to competitively appoint a water operator or can 
choose to grant exclusive rights to a publicly-owned undertaking, also called in-house 
operator.   
3.1. Principles governing competitive tendering in the water sector  
Issued in April 2000 by the European Commission, the Commission Interpretative 
Communication on Concessions under Community Law identifies the competitive 
tendering regime applicable to concessions. It states that concessions are subject to 
the provisions of the articles of the Treaty concerning right of establishment and 
freedom to provide services and to the principles emerging from ECJ jurisprudence. 
These are the principles of non-discrimination, equality of treatment, transparency, 
mutual recognition and proportionality (WRc and Ecologic, 2002: 15)7. 
The Interpretative Communication also states that “the Community does not give 
preference to any particular way of organising property, whether public or private”8. 
In fact, Article 345 (ex Article 295) of the Treaty provides for the Treaties not to 
“prejudice the rules in Member States governing the system of property ownership”, 
thus guaranteeing neutrality with regard to whether enterprises are public or private9. 
This implies that, in principle, the provisions of the articles of the Treaty concerning 
right of establishment and freedom to provide services and to the principles emerging 
from ECJ jurisprudence equally apply to public and private enterprises. 
Referring to the ECJ Überschär judgment10, the Interpretative Communication 
identifies the principle of equality of treatment as “one of the fundamental principles 
of Community law. This principle requires that similar situations shall not be treated 
differently unless differentiation is objectively justified”11. The ECJ Commerzbank 
judgment clarifies that the principle of equality of treatment does not only exclude 
differentiation on grounds of nationality but also “all covert forms of discrimination 
which, by the application of other criteria of differentiation, lead in fact to the same 
result”12. 
The Interpretative Communication and much ECJ case law focus on the procedural 
implications of the principle of equality of treatment for open and competitive 
bidding. These pertain to ensuring that all potential concessionaires have prior 
knowledge of the rules governing the tender, that such rules equally apply to all 
bidders so that they enjoy equal opportunities in formulating their tenders, and that all 
offers conform to the tender specifications “to guarantee an objective comparison 
between offers”. Conversely, an awarding entity is prohibited from taking account of 
changes to the initial offers of one tenderer, as this would obtain an advantage over 
his competitors (WRc and Ecologic, 2002: 67-68)13. 
However, the Interpretative Communication also refers to the two ECJ judgments 
Raulin14 and Parliament/Commission15 to state that ECJ case law “lays down that the 
principle of equality of treatment requires ... that conditions of access to an economic 
activity be non-discriminatory”16. Such requirement, coupled with the principle of 
neutrality on enterprise ownership, means that all potential concessionaires, whether 
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publicly or privately owned, should be granted the ability to compete for the award of 
a concession on a non-discriminatory basis. 
The Interpretative Communication states that the ECJ case law identifies the principle 
of proportionality as one of the general principles of Community law17, binding 
national authorities in the application of Community law18 even when these enjoy 
broad discretion19. Pursuant to the principle of proportionality, any measure adopted 
by a national or public authority “should be both necessary and appropriate in the 
light of the objectives sought”20. The Interpretative Communication refers to ECJ and 
CFI (Court of First Instance) jurisprudence21 to assert the principle that, “in choosing 
the measures to be taken, a Member State must adopt those which cause the least 
possible disruption to the pursuit of an economic activity”22. The requirement for 
Member States to adopt measures that are necessary and appropriate to achieve the 
intended objectives translates into a prohibition for national authorities from adopting 
measures which are excessive and disproportionate to achieve the same objectives23. 
Finally, the principle of proportionality requires that the pursuit of the financial 
viability of concessions should not undermine competition. “The duration of the 
concession must be set so that it does not limit open competition beyond what is 
required to ensure that the investment is paid off and there is a reasonable return on 
invested capital, whilst maintaining a risk inherent in exploitation by the 
concessionaire”24. 
3.2. Local authorities’ obligation to resort to competitive tendering and the 
conditions for the appointment of in-house operators  
Pursuant to ECJ case-law, the granting of a concession without resorting to 
competitive tendering is admissible only in exceptional circumstances. The ECJ 
Teckal judgment established that public procurement law shall be in principle 
applicable in cases where the juridical personality of the awarding authority was 
distinct from that of the undertaking which was awarded the contract, with one 
exception. More precisely, it provided that Directives 92/50/EEC and 93/36/EEC did 
not apply and that the granting of a concession without putting it out to competition 
was legal under EU law, “only in the case where the local authority exercises over the 
person concerned a control which is similar to that which it exercises over its own 
departments and, at the same time, that person carries out the essential part of its 
activities with the controlling local authority or authorities” (Lobina, 2005: 16)25. The 
exemption from public procurement law for in-house operators is valid even if these 
have a distinct legal personality from the awarding authority26. 
The Teckal judgment aimed at safeguarding “the objective of ensuring free and 
undistorted competition which the Community legislature seeks to achieve through 
the coordination of procedures for the award of public supply contracts”27. In the 
Carbotermo case, the ECJ reiterated that the two requirements set out in Teckal for 
the existence of an in-house relationship, and thus for the lawful appointment of a 
service provider without competitive tendering, “are aimed precisely at preventing 
distortions of competition”28. 
The first condition to be satisfied for local authorities to lawfully grant a service 
concession to an in-house operator concerns the control exercised by the local 
authority over the grantee. In the Parking Brixen case, the ECJ clarified that, for this 
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condition to be satisfied, the concession-granting authority had to exercise “decisive 
influence over both (the concessionaire’s) strategic objectives and significant 
decisions”29. Satisfaction of this condition might imply the full ownership of the in-
house operator by the granting authorities. In the Carbotermo judgment, the ECJ 
stated that “The fact that the contracting authority holds, alone or together with other 
public authorities, all of the share capital in a successful tenderer tends to indicate, 
without being decisive, that that contracting authority exercises over that company a 
control similar to that which it exercises over its own departments”30. 
In the Stadt Halle case, the ECJ ruled that a company majority owned by the awarding 
authorities, and minority owned by a private undertaking, cannot be regarded as an in-
house operator. Therefore, such company can only be appointed as concessionaire 
through competitive tendering, in application of public procurement law31. This is 
justified on the grounds that: a) an in-house relationship is expected to be informed by 
public interest objectives, not by the pursuit of private interests32; and, b) the direct 
award of a contract to a public-private company would be in breach of the principle of 
equal treatment as it would give the private company holding a minority share in the 
grantee an advantage over its competitors33. 
Furthermore, in Parking Brixen, the ECJ ruled that a public authority could not 
lawfully award a public service concession, without resorting to competitive 
tendering, to a company limited by shares displaying the following characteristics: a) 
the company limited by shares resulted from the conversion of a special undertaking 
of the awarding authority; b) the company’s objects had been extended to “significant 
new areas”; c) the company’s capital had to be opened in the short term to other 
owners; d) the geographical area of the company’s activities had been extended to the 
entire country and abroad; e) the company’s Administrative Board enjoyed “very 
broad management powers” and independence34. The ruling was issued in 
consideration that: a) the awarding authorities could not exercise over such a company 
a control similar to that which it exercises over its own departments35; and, b) the 
principle of equal treatment of tenderers, intended as affording equality of opportunity 
to all tenderers, irrespective of their nationality and even in absence of discrimination 
on the grounds of nationality, had to be respected36. 
The second condition required by the Teckal judgment for the existence of an in-
house relationship is that the contracting party carry out the essential part of its 
activities with the awarding authority or authorities, which in turn control the 
contracting party. In Carbotermo, the ECJ clarified that an in-house operator had to 
devote its activities “principally” to the controlling authority and that any other 
activities had to be “only of marginal significance”37. The rationale for such provision 
is that public procurement law should apply “in the event that an undertaking 
controlled by one or more authorities is active in the market and therefore likely to be 
in competition with other undertakings”38. It should be noted that national courts are 
competent to determine whether the essential part of an undertaking’s activities are 
carried out with the controlling authority or authorities. Such decision has to be made 
on the basis of factual qualitative and quantitative elements39. 
In summary, the two conditions set out by the Teckal judgment for the existence of an 
in-house relationship, and the lawful direct award of a concession, aim at ensuring 
free and undistorted competition and at safeguarding the principle of equal treatment 
of tenderers. 
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4. The 1994 reform of the Italian water sector and conflicts with EU 
competition law  
Italian law governing the water sector has undergone a number of reforms in recent 
years, first with the adoption of the 1994 Galli Law, requiring the restructuring of 
water supply and sanitation operations in broader concession areas, generally under a 
unique operator subject to regulation. The Galli Law did not require the introduction 
of PSP (private sector participation), but a number of subsequent laws have addressed 
the organisational form of water service providers, limiting the scope for public 
operations. Since 1994, legislative developments have facilitated growth in PSP, 
although publicly-owned water operators remain the large majority. Irrespective of a 
considerable initial delay in its implementation, the Galli Law is proving a major 
determinant of change with local authorities taking decisions on how to reform water 
supply and sanitation services at a pace that at the moment appears to have few equals 
in Europe. 
The so-called Galli Law (l. n. 36/94) aimed at addressing past underinvestment and 
new investment requirements by introducing entrepreneurial management and 
reducing the territorial and functional fragmentation of water operations. The Italian 
water sector has in fact known a long period of underinvestment caused by poor cost 
recovery. Estimates indicate that aggregate yearly capital investment in water supply 
and sanitation declined from ITL 4,478bn (€ 2.31bn) in 1985 to ITL 1,049bn (€ 
542.8m) in 1995, equal to a 76.57% reduction, due to excessively low tariffs and 
insufficient cost recovery. Also, it has been estimated that ITL 85,000bn (€ 43.9bn) 
would be required to upgrade water supply and sanitation services in order to meet the 
needs of the population and comply with EU legislation. In order to reduce the 
fragmentation of the sector, the Galli Law required not only the reduction of the 
number of operators and an increase in their relative size but also the vertical 
integration of water supply and sanitation operations. As of 1990, the water sector 
was in fact highly fragmented with over 5,500 independent management bodies 
responsible for the provision of water supply, 7,000 for sewerage and 2,000 for 
wastewater treatment. 
In order to overcome operational fragmentation and ensure the adequate dimensions 
of water operators, the Galli Law provided for the identification of 91 Optimal 
Territorial Basins or ATO (Ambiti Territoriali Ottimali). In each ATO, water supply 
and sanitation operations would be typically carried out under concessions of up to 30 
years, irrespective of whether these were awarded to a private or a public undertaking. 
Municipalities and provincial governments were to be responsible for the organisation 
and operation of water supply and sanitation services, according to Italian law as 
applicable to the selection of operators. In each ATO, local authorities were required 
to set up a joint body (“Autorità di Ambito” or AATO), responsible for planning and 
the regulation of water operators on their behalf. The provision of water operations 
had to be in conformity with the principles of efficiency, effectiveness and cost-
effectiveness and, in order to ensure economic viability, the Galli Law required the 
achievement of full cost recovery through tariffs. Local authorities had to set tariffs in 
relation to the organisational mode adopted – thus taking into account profitability 
requirements under different ownership and management arrangements. Average 
tariffs had also to reflect investment plans, in consideration of real costs and the 
economies obtained from efficiency improvements and the reduced fragmentation of 
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operations. Although not explicitly mentioned by the Galli Law, an important 
motivation underlying its adoption was allowing for the liberalisation of the Italian 
water sector and for a more prominent role of private operators as a reaction to Italy’s 
enormous public sector deficit. Prior to the enactment of the Galli Law, water 
undertakings active in the Italian water sector were mostly publicly-owned with 
private water companies accounting for only 4.9% (Lobina, 2005a). 
5. National legislation on the ownership and selection of water operators in light 
of European Commission initiatives 
Before 2001, Italian law had required the provision of public water operations under 
one or more of the following organisational modes: a) direct municipal management, 
whereby the service was provided by a department of the municipal authority with no 
distinction between the municipal budget and the operator’s accounts; b) “azienda 
municipalizzata”, a municipal undertaking deprived of juridical personality; c) 
“azienda speciale”, a municipal undertaking enjoying juridical personality and 
managerial autonomy in light of the general objectives and overall strategy defined by 
local authorities; d) private concession; e) Public Limited Companies (PLCs) or 
limited companies majority owned by local authorities. 
At the end of 2001, in order to prevent the emergence of conflicts with EU 
competition law, the Italian Ministry of the Environment adopted a number of 
initiatives restricting the options for local decision makers and aimed at introducing 
compulsory competitive tendering for the selection of water operators. Favour for 
compulsory competitive tendering in the selection of water operators was retained by 
the 2002 Budget Law adopted in December 2001, which attracted the attention of the 
EU Commission for alleged breach of EU law. The incriminated article of the 2002 
Budget Law was thus substantially amended and, as of December 2004, Italian law 
provided for water supply and sanitation services to be operated under any of the 
following types of undertaking: a) a PLC selected through competitive tendering; b) a 
public-private joint venture whereby the private partner is selected through 
competitive tendering; c) semi-privatised PLCs listed on the stock exchange; d) a PLC 
wholly-owned by local authorities, subject to conditions laid out in the Teckal case 
(Lobina, 2005a). 
5.1. Integration of the Galli Law and conflict avoidance with the EU Commission: 
the two circulars and decree issued by the Ministry of the Environment, October 
and November 2001 
On 17th October 2001, the Ministry of the Environment issued a circular on majority 
publicly-owned companies and the provision of water supply and sanitation services. 
The October 2001 circular was prompted by the fact that the EU Commission had 
initiated an infringement procedure against Italy, as the award of a number of 
operating contracts would have allegedly taken place in breach of EU Competition 
Law. The October 2001 circular did not elaborate on the specific provisions and 
principles of EU competition law breached by the actions of Italian local authorities, 
but argued that Italian law required local authorities to select water operators through 
competitive tendering “in all cases”, so that the in-house provision of water services 
would be de facto made impracticable. The circular also prescribed that public-private 
joint ventures could only be awarded water operating contracts through competitive 
tendering. The Ministry of the Environment explained that the adoption of such 
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recommendation would have the advantage of resulting in the end of the infringement 
procedure initiated by the EU Commission without the need to modify the existing 
Italian legislation. Successively, Italian law could have been modified in order to 
make the requirement for compulsory competitive tendering explicitly binding 
beyond any doubt of interpretation40. 
On 22nd November 2001, the Ministry of the Environment, after consulting with the 
national watchdog Supervising Committee, issued a decree regulating how local 
authorities should award water operating contracts to third parties. Art. 2.1 of the 
ministerial decree, which was issued nearly 8 years after the enactment of the Galli 
Law, established that the governing bodies of ATOs were responsible for selecting 
water operators through open and public tender, whereby the evaluation of bids would 
be based on the economic value of the offer (“offerta economicamente più 
vantaggiosa”). A number of undertakings were listed as being entitled to put forward 
bids in the competitive procedure, including PLCs, limited companies (“società a 
responsabilità limitata”), cooperatives, consortia of undertakings but not the 
municipally-owned “aziende speciali”. Also, the decree excluded the possibility of the 
so-called one-bidder tenders as it required that, in case only one candidate had been 
allowed to put forward a final bid, there would be no tendering and the contract could 
not be awarded. As regards the criteria for the selection of the operator, the main ones 
related to the improvement of the economic and financial plan elaborated by local 
authorities, in terms of the reduction of operating and capital costs and of their 
incidence on the average tariff. In the evaluation of the bids submitted, such criteria 
would have to account no less than the total of the points attributed in the light of the 
following considerations: a) safeguard of the environment, reduction of environmental 
impact to the lowest possible level and improvement of safety; b) early achievement 
or improvement of the standards set in the investment plan elaborated by local 
authorities and improvement in service quality; c) plan for the reallocation of workers 
employed under previous operations; d) technical and operational capability of the 
candidate undertaking and the structure responsible for carrying out operations. 
On 22nd November 2001, the Ministry of the Environment issued a circular aiming to 
clarify the rationale for the adoption of the decree issued on that same day as well as 
the legal requirements the decree was intended to meet. The November 2001 circular 
explained that the choice of competitive tendering, in the form of an open and public 
procedure, as the only mechanism to award a water operating contract to a third party 
was made as this was an agile and rapid instrument ensuring maximum transparency 
while complying with the requirements and safeguarding the interests of all 
stakeholders and involved parties. This time, contrary to the October 2001 circular, 
the Ministry of the Environment referred more explicitly to the EU law provisions and 
the infringement procedure which had represented a major motivation for identifying 
compulsory competitive tendering as the preferred solution. More precisely, the 
November 2001 circular reiterated that the establishment of mixed economy 
enterprises or public-private joint ventures were in breach of EU Competition Law 
and referred in that sense to the EU Council Directive 92/50 relating to the 
coordination of procedures for the award of public service contracts, as amended by 
Directive 52/97, as well as to no better specified decisions of the European Court of 
Justice. The circular further explained that since 1999 the EU Commission had 
initiated infringement procedure n. 2184 against Italy, which had been prompted by 
complaints against the award of the operating contract for Arezzo’s ATO 4 Alto 
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Valdarno and which, it seemed, would have addressed other complaints. On 8th 
November 2000, the EU Commission had started another infringement procedure 
against Italy arguing that the provisions contained in art. 22, l. n. 142/90 and 
successive modifications were in breach of the said Directive 92/50, as amended by 
Directive 52/97, and of EU Directive 93/38 coordinating the procurement procedures 
of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and telecommunications sectors 
(the so-called Utilities Directive), as well as in breach of the principles of 
transparency and equal treatment. As noted, the censored Italian provisions identified 
the organisational modes allowed for the provision of water services in: a) direct 
municipal management; b) municipally-owned “azienda speciale”; c) PLC or limited 
company, majority or minority owned by local authorities; d) concession to a third 
party (Lobina, 2005a).             
5.2. Legislation integrating the Galli Law: organisational mode pursuant the 2002 
Budget Law  
Although the Galli Law did not require restructuring to take place through 
privatisation or PPPs, the Budget Law for the year 2002 (l. n. 448/2001) contained a 
number of provisions encouraging the adoption of some form of PSP in the provision 
of water supply and sanitation. First, it provided for operators to be selected 
exclusively through competitive tendering and called for further legislation to regulate 
the expiry or anticipated cessation of concessions awarded without competitive 
tendering. Then, it barred any enterprise which had been granted the right to operate 
either in Italy or abroad, without taking part in a competitive tendering, from bidding 
for prospective tenders. In the water sector, local authorities were exceptionally 
allowed to award concessions to wholly publicly-owned corporations provided they 
did so within two years from enactment of the Budget Law and that within two years 
of the concession award an equity stake of at least 40% would be sold to a private 
operator selected through competitive tendering41. 
Apart from encouraging the adoption of some sort of PSP, art. 35, l. n. 448/2001 
would have drastically restricted the options for the involvement of wholly publicly-
owned water operators. In fact, it contained a provision requiring that by 30th June 
2003 local authorities transformed municipal enterprises known as “aziende speciali” 
and public consortia into publicly-owned PLCs42. The combined effect of legal 
provisions contained in art. 35, l. n. 448/2001 appeared to be that of limiting public 
water operations to the case of publicly-owned PLCs which were to succeed in 
competitive tendering for the award of long term concessions. However, it remained 
to be seen whether Italian law allowed for the long term existence of wholly publicly-
owned water PLCs as is the case, for example, in the Netherlands and Sweden. Art. 
115, DL 267/2000 provided that local authorities transforming “aziende speciali” into 
PLCs could remain the sole owners of the company for no longer than two years from 
the restructuring43. Art. 35, l. n. 448/2001 further discouraged resort to public water 
operators as it forbid any favourable treatment among providers of public services, de 
facto requiring that private and public operators were subject to the same discipline. 
For example, no public or private water operator would have been entitled to receive a 
more favourable treatment from the fiscal point of view or in terms of financial 
contributions and subsidies44. 
Finally, it should be noted that art. 35, l. n. 448/2001 introduced an incentive for local 
authorities to merge water operations at ATO level, as required by the Galli Law. In 
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fact, art. 35.2 called for the adoption of a regulation to define the terms of expiry or 
anticipated cessation of concessions awarded without competitive tender, provided 
these terms were no less than 3 years and no more than 5 years. Art. 35.3 provided for 
the extension of the transitional period depending on a number of circumstances. The 
transitional period could have been extended for no less than one year in case the 
operator, through one or more mergers, at least doubled the customer base served by 
the major of the merged undertakings. The transitional period could have been 
extended for no less than two years in case the operator, through one or more mergers, 
was active across the whole territory of the respective ATO. The transitional period 
could have been extended for no less than one year in case the operator selected a 
minor private partner holding an equity stake of at least 40% and an additional year in 
case the private partner held an equity stake of at least 51%. It should be noted that 
art. 35.4 allowed for a longer extension of the transitional period in case more than 
one of the above conditions was met. For example, if a number of mergers enabled 
the operator to double its original customer base and become active across the whole 
ATO at the same time, the transitional period could have been extended for no less 
than 3 years (and no less than 4 years in case the same operator had also selected a 
private partner holding a 40% equity stake)45 (Lobina, 2005a). 
5.3. Alleged conflicts between the 2002 Budget Law and EU legislation 
Art. 35, l. n. 448/2001 has led to a considerable amount of controversy, both at EU 
and national level, resulting in the implementation of its provisions being frozen first 
and substantially amended by legislation introduced in November 2003. The 
infringement procedure initiated by the EU Commission against Italy, which was 
referred to in the 17th October 2001 circular issued by the Ministry of the 
Environment (see section 3.1 Integration of the Galli Law and conflict avoidance with 
the EU Commission: the two circulars and decree issued by the Ministry of the 
Environment, October and November 2001 above) was in fact transfused into an 
infringement procedure prompted by the enactment of art. 35, l. n. 448/200146. 
 
On 26th June 2002, the EU Commission wrote a letter to the Italian government - 
letter n. 1999/2184 C(2002)2329 - opening the preliminary phase of an infringement 
procedure in the light of alleged conflicts between a number of provisions contained 
in art. 35, l. n. 448/2001 and EC law (Belfiori, 2002). The Commission (the letter was 
signed by Commissioner Frits Bolkestein) argued that art. 35.2, 35.3 and 35.4 – 
related to the transitional period enjoyed by operators previously selected without 
undergoing competitive tendering – were in conflict with Directive 92/50/EEC 
relating to the coordination of procedures for the award of public service contracts, 
with Directive 93/38/EEC coordinating the procurement procedures of entities 
operating in the water, energy, transport and telecommunications sectors, as well as in 
conflict with Articles 43 and 49 of the Treaty establishing the European Community, 
respectively on the right of establishment and on services. More precisely, the 
Commission censored the excessive duration of the envisaged transitional period.  
 
The Commission also argued that art. 35.5 – exceptionally entitling local authorities 
to award water concessions to wholly publicly-owned corporations based in the 
respective ATO, provided that within two years of the concession award an equity 
stake of at least 40% should be sold to a private operator selected through competitive 
tendering - was in conflict with EU law principles on the concession of services. The 
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Commission pointed out that, according to the case-law of the Court of Justice of the 
European Communities (ECJ), the award of concessions without public and 
competitive tendering was only admissible in exceptional circumstances but not in the 
cases contemplated by art. 35, l. n. 448/2001. More precisely, the Commission 
referred to the ECJ ruling known as the “Teckal” case (ECJ C-107\98, 18th November 
1998) as establishing the principle that EU competition shall be applicable in cases 
where the juridical personality of the awarding authority was distinct from that of the 
undertaking which was to run the service. ECJ C-107\98 provided that Directives 
92/50/EEC and 93/36/EEC did not apply and that the award of a concession without 
public and competitive tendering was legal under EU law, “only in the case where the 
local authority exercises over the person concerned a control which is similar to that 
which it exercises over its own departments and, at the same time, that person carries 
out the essential part of its activities with the controlling local authority or 
authorities”47.   
 
The Commission specifically referred to a number of cases as examples of water 
concessions awarded against EU competition law, including the award to Acea Ato 2 
SpA (covering ATO 2 Lazio Centrale-Roma), Publiacqua SpA (covering ATO 3 
Toscana del Medio Valdarno) and Acque SpA (covering ATO 2 Toscana del Basso 
Valdarno). The last two companies had been initially set up by locally authorities as 
wholly publicly-owned PLCs and directly awarded long term operating contracts 
without facing competition. After the awards, both had proceeded to select private 
operators as minority shareholders and thus were transformed in public-private joint 
ventures (Lobina, 2005a). 
5.4. Legislation integrating the Galli Law in response to the EU Commission: art. 
14, D.L. n. 269/2003  
On 19th November 2003, the lower house of the Italian Parliament approved a decree 
containing urgent provisions for the improvement and the correction of the public 
budget, which partially amended previous legislation integrating the Galli Law. Even 
so, the legislative framework was not definite yet, as further provisions were expected 
to be introduced by the upcoming 2004 Budget Law. Nonetheless, art. 14, D.L. n. 
269/2003 appeared to contribute to the clarity of the legal framework governing water 
supply and sanitation, in that it amended rules introduced with the 2002 Budget Law 
as a response to the reprimand of the EU Commission and an attempt to thoroughly 
integrate EU law into Italian legislation, especially in the light of the jurisprudence of 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ)48. Art. 14 of the November 2003 decree did so 
first by abolishing the transition period allowed to undertakings which had been 
awarded a concession non-competitively, whose duration the EU Commission had 
been judged as excessive; then, by clarifying rules on the ownership and control of 
undertakings allowed to operate water services. For example, art. 14 appeared to 
redefine the scope for public water operations, eliminating some of the restrictions 
and conditions introduced by the 2002 Budget Law and offering local decision makers 
a clearer set of alternative organisational forms for the provision of water services.    
Integrated by art. 14, D.L. n. 269/2003, the new legislation stipulated that, subject to 
compliance with Italian sectoral legislation and EU law, water supply and sanitation 
services may be operated by undertakings established under three alternative 
organisational forms: 
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a) a company selected through competitive tendering;  
b) a public-private joint venture whereby the private partner is selected through 
competitive tendering, pursuant to Italian and EU competition law as defined by 
guidelines issued by the competent authorities through specific measures or 
administrative instruments;  
c) a company wholly-owned by local authorities, provided that the local authority or 
authorities owning the capital “exercise over the undertaking concerned a control 
which is similar to that which they exercise over their own departments and, at the 
same time, that undertaking carries out the essential part of its activities with the 
controlling local authority or authorities” (author’s translation)49. It should be 
noted that this part of art. 14 was phrased after the wording of the “Teckal” case 
(cit. par. 50).     
 
In other words, the selection of a PLC wholly-owned by local authorities without 
competitive tendering was subjected to the fact that the local authorities owning the 
whole of the undertaking’s capital not only controlled it through a number of 
procedures but also that the undertaking carried out the most important part of its 
activity – that is to say, the operation of local public services - in the territory 
governed by the controlling local authorities (Barbiero, 2003). Provisions specifically 
allowing for the possibility of legally granting water operations to 100% publicly-
owned companies represented a major innovation in respect of the content of the 2002 
Budget Law and aimed at adopting principles of EU law as elaborated by ECJ 
jurisprudence on the provision of services in-house, with particular reference to the 
“Teckal” case. Other relevant rulings include ECJ C-108\98 (9th September 1999), 
ECJ C-176\98 (2nd December 1999), ECJ C-324\98 (7th December 2000), ECJ C-
94\99 (7th December 2000)50. On the other hand, art. 14, D.L. n. 269/2003 like the 
2002 Budget Law appeared to exclude other organisational forms under public 
ownership and management apart from the publicly-owned and controlled company 
(Barbiero, 2003)51. In other words, the traditional municipal enterprises such as those 
established in the form of “azienda speciale” would not survive the reform. Art. 35, l. 
n. 448/2001 explicitly required that any “azienda speciale” or publicly-owned 
consortia be transformed into a company, for example a PLC, by 31st December 
200252. Art. 14, D.L. n. 269/2003 confirmed that provision and established that all 
concessions awarded without competitive procedures would expire by no later than 
31st December 2006, but that this did not apply to public-private joint ventures, 
whereby the private partner had been selected through competitive tendering, nor to 
publicly-owned and controlled companies. At the expiry of the December 2006 
deadline, local authorities would be left to choose the new organisational mode 
among the three forms described above53, whereby the publicly-owned and controlled 
company represented the only form of public provision. According to Barbiero 
(2003), such a publicly-owned and controlled company was to be assimilated to 
entities governed by public law. Belfiori (2003) explained the rationale for the 
exclusion of publicly-owned companies from EU competition law in the fact that, 
although the formal corporate structure of the PLC originated from commercial law, 
this was de facto used to convey public sector interests through public ownership of 
the PLC and the control exerted by local authorities. 
Although art. 14, D.L. n. 269/2003 did not specify the type of ownership of the 
companies allowed to participate in the competitive tender for the selection of 
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operators (private, public-private or public), it did confirm the exclusion from the 
bidding procedure of any undertaking which had been awarded a concession non-
competitively. It also remained to be seen whether the validation of public-private 
joint ventures, whereby the private partner was chosen through competitive tendering, 
would meet the objections raised by the EU Commission in its letter n. 1999/2184 
C(2002)2329. In fact, public-private partnerships were not covered by the Teckal case 
which the Commission saw as the only possible justification for allowing exceptions 
to the general rule of concessions having to be awarded through competitive 
tendering. Quite importantly, art. 14, D.L. n. 269/2003 reaffirmed that no public or 
private water operator would be entitled to receive a more favourable treatment from 
the fiscal point of view or in terms of financial contributions and subsidies. 
Art. 14, D.L. n. 269/2003 amended provisions of the 2002 Budget Law encouraging 
the concentration of operations at ATO level by reducing the allegedly excessive 
duration of the transition period, but retained the same objective. More precisely, it 
established that the above December 2006 deadline for the cessation of all 
concessions awarded non-competitively could be postponed subject to a prior ad hoc 
agreement with the EU Commission. Local authorities could extend the transitional 
period for no more than 1 year in case that, by 31st December 2005, a new 
undertaking had been created through one or more mergers, whereby the new 
company served at least twice the original customer base of the major of the merging 
operators. Local authorities could extend the transitional period for no more than 2 
years in case that, by 31st December 2005, the undertaking operating the concession to 
be terminated had managed to extend its operations to the entire ATO, even through 
one or more mergers (Lobina, 2005a). 
5.5. Legislation integrating the Galli Law in response to the EU Commission: art. 
4.234, Budget Law 2004 (L. n. 350/2003) 
On 24th December 2004, the Italian Parliament adopted the 2004 Budget Law (l. n. 
350/2003)54, whose art. 4.234 contained a number of provisions integrating art. 14, 
D.L. n. 269/2003 approved less than one and a half months before. Among such 
provisions, two types of concessions obtained without competition were made exempt 
from cessation by 31st December 2006. The first type included concessions awarded 
before 1st October 2003 to companies listed on the stock exchange and/or their 
subsidiaries, provided those were the exclusive concessionaires. The second type was 
constituted of concessions awarded to companies which were initially entirely owned 
by public authorities and that, before 1st October 2003, had placed equity stakes on the 
market through open and public procedures. In both cases, the concessions would not 
last longer than the average duration of water concessions awarded through 
competitive tender unless that period was extended, on a case by case basis, in order 
to allow for the full depreciation of specific investments made by the operator.  
Furthermore, art. 4.234 provided that the exclusion from competitive tendering of 
international and Italian companies which had obtained concessions without facing 
competition in Italy or abroad would apply starting from 1st January 2007. However, 
there would be an exception in case a company was participating for the first time in 
bidding procedure for services in a given sector. The government was required to 
issue secondary legislation (“regolamento”) defining the conditions for allowing 
foreign companies to participate in tenders, provided that the reciprocity principle was 
respected and that the timing for the opening of the relative markets was guaranteed. 
 19 
The same statutory instrument would also set the discipline for the participation of 
Italian companies that had obtained concessions abroad without going through open 
and public procedures55. 
In May 2004, the Italian government expected the infringement procedure initiated by 
the EU Commission to be closed soon, as the new legislative provisions had been 
agreed word by word with the EU Commission itself. This was done in order to 
ensure that Italian law on the appointment of water operators addressed the 
Commission’s concerns and complied with EU Competition Law56 (Lobina, 2005a). 
6. Experiences with implementation of water sector reform in three Italian 
cities 
6.1. Public-private concession in Arezzo 
As of 1990, water supply, sewerage and wastewater treatment services in the 
commune of Arezzo were provided by municipal departments, under direct municipal 
management. The prospect of the adoption of the Galli Law prompted local 
authorities to prepare for sectoral reform and a decision was made in 1992 to award 
the operation of water supply, sewerage and wastewater treatment services to the 
publicly-owned gas supplier Coingas, which would previously be transformed into a 
“azienda speciale”. Arezzo mayor Valdo Vannucci could not implement the decision 
as his mandate terminated in 1995 and new mayor Paolo Ricci opted in favour of the 
award of water services to a public-private single purpose company, rather than to a 
wholly municipally-owned multi-utility. Mr. Ricci argued that the latter solution 
would have not ensured financial transparency as cross-subsidisation could have taken 
place between gas and water operations57. The only way to have full financial 
transparency was, according to Mr. Ricci, to award a water supply and sanitation 
concession to an operator selected by competitive tendering. A public-private joint 
venture would have ensured the private operator’s contribution in terms of expertise 
and ability to tap investment finance as well as local control and attention for public 
interest considerations58. The debate on the merits of the two options was limited to 
the political domain and no comparative evaluation of business plans elaborated under 
the two hypotheses was carried out. 
In 1999, water supply and sanitation operations in the Arezzo area (ATO 4 “Alto 
Valdarno”) were semi-privatised as a 25-year concession was awarded to a public-
private joint venture managed by a Suez-led consortium. The decision to appoint a 
public-private PLC was justified by local authorities as it would allow for benefiting 
from the private operator’s experience in terms of entrepreneurial management and its 
ability to provide considerable financial resources to fund projected investments. 
However, such decision was also motivated by fiscal gains the Arezzo municipal 
government and other local authorities expected as a result of handing operations over 
to public-private PLC Nuove Acque. According to local consumer organisation 
FederConsumatori, the municipality of Arezzo obtained substantial fiscal gains from 
the transfer of water operations from its departments to the public-private 
concessionaire, which have been used to relieve the municipal budget. This is the 
longest standing case of implementation of water sector reform pursuant to the Galli 
Law and has proven highly controversial. Issues emerging from the case of Arezzo 
include restricted competition, poor performance in achieving the intended objectives 
of the reform, high level of conflict between local authorities and the private operator, 
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the questionable dynamics of water pricing and investments under PSP, and concerns 
for regulatory capture (Lobina, 2005b). 
6.1.1 Competition-related issues 
The call for tenders required candidate companies to meet criteria so demanding that 
only three companies, two of which were the world leading water multinationals 
(MNCs), did put forward bids. Apart from Suez and Vivendi (now called Veolia 
Environnement), the other bidder was Rome’s Acea. Although it had been providing 
water supply and sanitation services to a population of some 3 million people in Rome 
(almost 10 times that of the Arezzo concession area) for 15 years, Acea barely met the 
requirements set by local authorities to participate in the tender. More precisely, 
restricted competition was the result of, among other factors, the prominence of 
operating experience as a criterion, not only in the admission of candidates to the 
tender, but also in the evaluation of bids put forward. 
On 14th January 1999, the evaluation commission ruled that the Suez-led consortium 
had won the bidding procedure with a total of 83 points, compared to 59 points 
attributed to Vivendi and 43 to Acea59. Suez obtained more points than its two 
competitors in each of the broad areas of evaluation: a) 41 of the available 45 points 
for the acquired experience60; b) 26 of the available 35 points for proposed 
improvements to the investment plan61; c) 12 of the 15 points available for project 
finance62; d) 4 of the 5 points available for the payment of equity shares63. 
It should be noted that Suez projected tariff levels higher than both competitors as 
well as the tariff based on the provisional PdA. However, the evaluation commission 
decided unanimously to disregard tariff levels projected by bidders, as these were 
based on different managerial and accounting hypotheses. When compared on a like-
for-like basis, tariff levels under the three bids showed little difference and the 
evaluation commission appreciated that the causes of disparity between projected 
tariffs could have been easily eliminated during negotiations prior to the concession 
award64. In terms of rational decision making, such decision appears questionable as 
the effects of different approaches informing the three bids were taken into account in 
any other aspect of the evaluation. Furthermore, the commission adjusted the 
technical evaluation of bids by taking into account the effect of a political decision, 
that to renegotiate tariff levels prior to the concession award, which rested exclusively 
on the “Autorità d’Ambito” and which the commission itself could not control65. In 
fact, no revision of tariffs took place prior to the concession award and the business 
plan put forward by the Suez-led consortium was accepted without changes66. 
It should also be noted that Suez projected operating costs higher than Vivendi by ITL 
112 billion, higher than Acea by ITL 83 billion and higher than the amount set in the 
provisional PdA by ITL 96 billion. The commission commented that the higher 
operating costs projected by Suez were justified by the necessity to spend to achieve 
efficiency. More precisely, in order to achieve efficiency savings in the cost of the 
workforce, in electricity and sludge disposal, Suez would have sustained higher costs 
in terms of consultancy and technical assistance. Suez projected savings of ITL 31 
billion in light of reduced personnel costs, although the progression of remuneration 
formulated in the Suez bid (+3% annually on the costs projected by the provisional 
PdA) would result in an increase of ITL 70 billion in the cost of the workforce67.  
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Interestingly, Suez formulated the hypothesis that it would perceive dividends for the 
first 14 years of operations, so that all profits could be reinvested in the system 
reducing the necessity to resort to external finance and allowing the public-private 
water company to reduce its indebtedness. In the remaining part of the concession, 
dividends projected would compensate shareholders for dividends foregone during the 
first 14 years. On the other hand, Vivendi and Acea projected dividends in the first 14 
years of operations totalling respectively ITL 87.4 billion and ITL 41.4 billion68. 
As regards the evaluation of the arrangements for project finance, Suez prevailed as it 
had indicated a more favourable interest rate but also as it accompanied its bid with a 
binding agreement from supporting banks to provide at least a part of the required 
amount. Conversely, Vivendi and Acea only submitted generic declarations on the 
banks’ intentions to finance the project (Lobina, 2005b)69. 
6.1.2 Experience with private operations following the competitive award of the 
concession 
The concession agreement requested the operator to constantly improve efficiency by 
reducing operating costs as a result of projected investments and provided for 
investments totalling over ITL 365.5 billion across the lifetime of the concession, with 
more than 75% of all investments concentrated in the first 12 years. The public-
private concessionaire had a contractual obligation to start project financing in March 
2000, tapping a total of ITL 70 billion in order to fund investments to be realised in 
the first six years of the concession. Not only has the private operator failed to tap 
project finance by the agreed date and subsequent extensions, but the expected 
efficiency has also failed to materialise as considerable losses were recorded in the 
first operating years. 
Conflicts between local authorities and the private operator have arisen as the local 
regulator moved to sanction alleged inefficiencies in the conduction of semi-
privatised water operations, after probing the costs and effectiveness of technical 
assistance (known as “prestazioni accessorie”) purchased from the private 
shareholders and specifically Suez. Although local authorities owned 54% of the 
public-private joint venture, the latter forcefully reacted by taking a number of tactical 
initiatives against the very same local authorities, including blocking local authorities’ 
decisions by resorting to the administrative justice and suspending payment of 
concession fees,  which put communes under considerable pressure from the fiscal 
point of view as the foregone payments were undermining the ability of the 
municipalities to respect the stability pact. Also, the municipalities renounced exerting 
regulatory pressure due to the perceived threat of having to pay multi-million 
compensation in front of an arbitrational tribunal. As a result, at the end of 2003 the 
municipal governments agreed to renegotiate the terms of the concession in favour of 
the private operator. While projected volumetric tariffs were maintained at stable 
levels, fix charges for access to the services were substantially increased and part of 
the investment programme was postponed. 
According to the local citizen organisation Forum Sociale Arezzo, total investments 
projected by the 2003 business plan were some € 9.2 million less than what projected 
by the 2000 business plan in nominal terms, although the difference in real terms 
amounted to some € 17.9 million. Also, the aggregate value of the controversial 
“prestazioni accessorie” to be purchased from the private operator decreased by a 
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mere € 0.8 million while total revenues from the fix charge for access to the service 
were projected at € 52.1 million. Furthermore, the overall result of the renegotiation 
completed in December 2003 was that Nuove Acque would gain a total € 115.02 
million in respect of what projected by the 2000 business plan, while taxpayers and 
consumers would only gain a total € 0.84 million. The net gain for the public-private 
concessionaire would thus amount to € 114.18 million (Lobina, 2005b). 
6.2. Wastewater BOTs and in-house restructuring of water supply and sewerage 
operations in Milan 
The reform of water supply and sanitation services in the city of Milan has followed 
two different sets of developments. Until recently, virtually all of Milan’s sewage was 
discharged untreated into water courses due to the lack of adequate wastewater 
treatment plants. PSP in the wastewater sector has been introduced through the award 
of three wastewater treatment contracts, including two major BOT-style contracts and 
a minor construction contract, which have proved highly controversial in many 
respects. Protracted delays have led to condemnation of the city on grounds of breach 
of EU Law, with other issues including allegations of excessive costs, corruption and 
restricted competition. It should be noted that French MNCs have resorted to a 
number of tactics and eventually succeeded in dominating the local market. By 
contrast, PSP in water supply and sewerage has not been introduced yet and, despite 
initial plans to part-privatise the operations which were carried out under direct 
municipal management, a short term concession has been awarded to a municipally-
owned PLC and recently been extended. 
6.2.1 The limits of competition in wastewater treatment 
In July 1998, Milan deputy prosecutors turned down a 103 pages long dossier, 
submitted by former Milan vice-mayor Giorgio Malagoli and a number of Milan city 
councillors, without bringing charges. The dossier denounced the anti-competitive 
practices of a number of Italian and foreign companies in relation to the award of the 
wastewater BOTs in Milan. More precisely, the dossier exposed a December 1988 
accord between 6 companies including EMIT (the former Acqua of the Pisante 
brothers, which owned 100% of SIBA until 1999 when Veolia’s subsidiary OTV 
acquired 50% of its capital), and Suez Degrémont, aiming at rigging the award of 
works contracts related to Milan’s wastewater treatment system. In case a wastewater 
treatment plant had been awarded to any of the parties to the accord, titled “Progetto 
Milano”, works contracts would be distributed to all the signatories according to a 
predetermined percentage of total value: EMIT would be entitled to 16.70%, 
Degremont would be also entitled to 16.70%, and so on. The judges decided not to 
proceed arguing that no corruption had taken place, although Mr. Malagoli had 
requested magistrate to investigate on the possibility of other crimes having been 
committed70. However, this suggests that private companies might have incentives at 
rigging competition in pursuit of commercial considerations. 
In July 2001, Milan court magistrates convicted Alain Maetz, a senior manager in 
Veolia’s water division, and local politicians for bribery in connection with the award 
of the tender for the construction and operation of the Milan South wastewater 
treatment plant. Former president of Milan city council Massimo De Carolis and Mr. 
Maetz received prison sentences. In May 2003 the appeal sentence confirmed 
corruption charges against both Mr. De Carolis and Mr. Maetz. In August 2000, the 
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contract for the construction and management of the Milan South plant was awarded 
to a consortium led by small Spanish MNC Pridesa (now owned by RWE/Thames), 
but Suez Degrémont appealed to the administrative justice and succeeded in having 
the award annulled more than one year after works had started. The Milan South 
contract was effectively awarded to Degrémont in late 2001 without holding a new 
competitive tendering, nor a competitive assessment of Pridesa’s and Degremont’s 
bids. The threat of the EU-imposed multi-million penalty apparently was a major 
factor in the local decision to expeditiously award the contract. However, this led to a 
surge in the total costs of the construction and management of the plant as Degrémont 
had projected higher construction costs than Pridesa. As a result, the Milan South 
BOT is now more expensive than the Nosedo BOT although the former is smaller 
(1,050,000 population equivalent vs. 1,250,000 population equivalent) and is going to 
be managed by the private operator for a shorter period (5 years vs. 12 and a half 
years). 
Conversely, the Nosedo BOT was awarded in March 2001 to a private consortium led 
by Veolia subsidiary Siba and including Suez Degrémont and Veolia’s OTV. Works 
have been carried out by Siba, which is 50% owned by Veolia with the remaining 
50% held by Italian company Emit. The municipality of Milan will directly contribute 
45% of total costs (equal to some €60.66 million), by tapping into an ad hoc fund 
constituted by water bills paid by consumers since 1997, while the remaining 55% 
(corresponding to €74.14 million) is to be tapped by the private consortium in the 
form of project finance. Interestingly, the opposition had criticised the scheme for its 
soaring costs overtime and for the fact that the starting offer for the procurement 
auction had been fixed at 5/4 of the starting offer for the auction held for the smaller 
Milan South plant, instead of being set at 5/4 of Pridesa’s successful bid. It should 
also be noted that Siba’s mother company Emit had won the tender for the Nosedo 
BOT in 1984, before OTV acquired 50% of Siba. Following that, Emit’s management 
was investigated on alleged irregularities in the award and the scheme was suspended 
for 4 years pending an environmental impact assessment. Emit then resorted to 
arbitration seeking damages for the delays suffered and in 1998 the two parties settled 
the dispute by agreeing that the city council would pay ITL 3billion damages to Emit. 
Also, the municipality of Milan would have contributed 45% of project costs, thus 
reducing the amount of project finance to be tapped by the private operator. Finally, 
construction of the minor Peschiera Borromeo wastewater treatment plant has been 
lately awarded to a joint venture between Veolia Siba and Suez Degrémont. It is 
worth noting that the conviction of Veolia's senior manager Alain Maetz on grounds 
of corruption has apparently not affected the MNC's ability to bid for wastewater 
contracts in Milan. 
Although the “Progetto Milano” accord appeared to be confined exclusively to works 
contracts, the behaviour of the two major multinationals in the sector (Suez through 
Degrémont and Veolia through OTV and SIBA) has resulted in restricted competition 
in the award of the three contracts for the Milan wastewater treatment plants. In fact, 
the SIBA-led consortium awarded the BOT for Nosedo also includes Degrémont 
while the construction of the Peschiera Borromeo plant has been awarded to a joint 
venture between SIBA and Degrémont. 
Furthermore, the conviction of Veolia's senior manager Alain Maetz on grounds of 
corruption has apparently not affected the multinational's ability to bid for wastewater 
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contracts in Milan. It should be noted that the court ruling on the corruption case was 
rendered in July 2001, but the scandal broke out in March 2000 as it emerged that the 
Italian police had obtained hard evidence of Maetz's plans to bribe local politicians in 
the majority and opposition parties. 
In relation to the bidding procedure for the Milan South plant, OTV, which had 
submitted a higher bid than Pridesa and Degrémont, was excluded for failure to 
comply with formal requirements in the presentation of the economic offer. The 
contract was awarded in August 2000. As regards the bidding procedure for the 
Peschiera Borromeo plant, the conviction of Alain Maetz did not prevent Veolia from 
bidding through its subsidiary SIBA (Lobina and Paccagnan, 2005). 
6.2.2 In-house operations in water supply and sewerage 
Following the adoption of the Galli Law, the restructuring of operations has been 
considered a number of times until the award of a short term concession to wholly 
municipally-owned PLC Metropolitana Milanese (MM) in 2003. The performance of 
water operations under direct municipal management had been satisfactory, as 
suggested by the relatively low level of UFW at less than 10%. However, 
considerable resources were diverted to the municipal budget to fund expenditure in 
other services rather than reinvestment into the water system, so that the ensuing 
under-spending affected not only infrastructure maintenance but also human resources 
development with the employment of new personnel being blocked despite the need 
for highly skilled technicians. 
In March 1997, the administration of Milan mayor Marco Formentini approved a 
resolution to form a municipally-owned “Azienda Speciale” which would be 
responsible for operating water supply and sanitation services under a concession. 
That would have allowed for the introduction of financial transparency by separating 
the water service book-keeping from the municipal budget and addressing the issue of 
under-investment. Nonetheless, the decision could not be implemented as the 
Formentini administration did not have enough time prior to the 1997 municipal 
elections which saw the victory of Gabriele Albertini. The new mayor decided to 
reverse the decision of the prior administration and in October 1999 the city council 
adopted a decision to abolish the municipal department which had operated water 
supply and sewerage since the late XIX century, and to transfer operations to a PLC 
majority owned by the city council, after the latter had been set up. The PLC, which 
was to be named SOGEA, would be 99% owned by the city council and 1% owned by 
the partly municipally-owned electric utility AEM Milan. SOGEA was expected to 
start operations at the end of 2001 and, apparently, the city administration intended to 
proceed with its privatisation. However, before SOGEA was set up, the Italian 
Parliament approved l. n. 448/2001 in December 2001 (the 2002 Budget Law) whose 
art. 35 imposed de facto the selection of water operators exclusively through 
competitive tendering, with the only exception being represented by the direct award 
of a concession to a wholly publicly-owned company provided that within two years 
of the concession award an equity stake of at least 40% was sold to a private operator 
selected through competitive tendering. 
As a reaction to the adoption of art. 35, l. n. 448/2001, in June 2003 a water supply 
and sewerage concession of between 2 to 5 years was awarded to Metropolitana 
Milanese (MM), a publicly-owned engineering and construction company operating 
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the underground service in Milan. The direct award of the short-term concession to 
MM was motivated by: a) the municipal government’s willingness to avoid 
competitive tendering pursuant to the national 2002 budget law, as it was feared that 
one of the French MNCs would have won the tender; b) the municipal government’s 
willingness to take advantage of MM’s experience and technical know-how, its 
potential and to enhance MM’s valorisation, as its core activity was stagnating. 
Although MM appeared fully equipped to address the weaknesses observed under 
direct municipal management, in terms of limited technical capacity and due to a 
bureaucratic rather than flexible management style, the mayor was considering 
whether to list MM on the stock exchange or to sell around 40% of its capital to a 
private partner (Lobina and Paccagnan, 2005). 
The proposed privatisation was functional to increasing the value of Milan’s energy 
company AEM, which the municipal administration wanted to acquire MM, in view 
of its merger with Brescia’s multi-utility ASM. In other words, the deal would not aim 
at enhancing MM’s efficiency. In August 2007, with the merger between AEM and 
ASM already completed and public water supply and sewerage operations showing 
positive results, the hypothesis of privatising MM was abandoned and a 20-year water 
supply and sewerage concession was about to be awarded to MM. In its 5 years of 
operations, MM had systematically reinvested all profits into the system, totalling € 
31 million investments in water supply only over 3 and a half years, while keeping 
tariffs at € 0.46 per cubic metre since 2001. Efforts for reducing the already low levels 
of UFW were constant and MM spent € 2 million per year on interventions. In 2006, 
out of revenues of nearly € 110 million, it paid a € 22.87 million fee to the municipal 
government for the use of the infrastructure (Martinelli, 2007). 
7. Discussion of findings 
This paper addresses the merits of competition for the market as a regulatory 
instrument in water supply and sanitation. It does so in light of the overarching 
function EU public procurement law and Italian national legislation reserve to 
competitive tendering for the selection of water service operators. 
7.1. Competitiveness of the bidding procedure 
The cases of Arezzo and Milan suggest that Demsetz competition is a limited tool to 
regulate a natural monopoly such as water supply and sanitation services. More 
precisely, the case of the Milan wastewater BOTs shows how tendering procedures 
might be affected by collusion among bidders and bribery of public official by private 
executives (respectively, private-private and private-public corruption according to 
the taxonomy used by the Water Integrity Network). The case of Arezzo shows that 
the rules governing competitive tendering might be defined as to de facto restrict 
competition, while the behaviour of Acea and Suez in their joint bids for a number of 
contracts in Tuscany illustrates that the water market is characterised by high barriers 
to entry and that alliances and cooperation among a limited number of major 
players/competitors might result in lowering contestability. 
Following the competitive tendering for the Arezzo concession, in which Suez 
prevailed over Vivendi and Acea, and Suez’ failed attempt to annul the decision to 
uncompetitively appoint ACEA as operator in Rome, the two companies found it 
expedient to forge an alliance. This led to the two companies putting forward a 
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number of joint bids, and successfully so in Siena/Grosseto, Pisa and Florence, thus 
acquiring a dominant position in Tuscany. At the same time, Suez owns nearly 10% 
of Acea which is the largest Italian private operator. Such dynamics have made the 
object of scrutiny by the Italian antitrust authority and a decision on the validity of the 
joint Acea and Suez bid in Florence is expected by end November 2007. 
 
Figure.  Joint ventures between leading water multinationals, 2002 
 
 
 
In this respect, Lobina and Hall (2003: 6) note that “In France, where they control 
85% of private water operations, Suez and Vivendi have created joint subsidiaries in a 
number of towns and regions, with the effect of restricting competition in the French 
private water market. In July 2002, the French competition council (“Conseil de la 
concurrence”) ruled that Suez (Lyonnaise des Eaux - SLDE) and Vivendi (Générale 
des Eaux - CGE) had been abusing their market dominance in France: a report by the 
Competition Council listed 12 joint ventures in France, including cities such as 
Marseilles and Lille – two of these joint ventures also involved SAUR, the third 
largest water company. The Competition Council recommended that the Ministry of 
Economy act to force CGE and SLDE to remedy the situation by dismantling their 
joint ventures (Conseil de la Concurrence, 2002)”. As shown by the above figure, this 
forming of joint ventures is not restricted to France and Italy and it has contributed to 
restricting competition in the global water market (Lobina and Hall, 2003: 5-6, 42). 
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7.2. Regulation by contract, contract execution and efficiency 
The Latina bidding procedure has attracted the highest number of tenders since the 
1994 reform of the Italian water sector. Nonetheless, the execution of the contract 
proved highly controversial as the use of contracting out by the concessionaire 
undermined the efficiency of operations. Taking advantage of sectoral rules 
guaranteeing the commercial viability of the concession by allowing for passing 
operational costs on to consumers, the operator resorted to transfer pricing. This 
practice was exposed by investigations by the Italian criminal justice. 
Furthermore, the cases of Arezzo and the Milan wastewater treatment BOTs suggest 
that Demstez competition cannot be expected to deliver efficiency in a sector where 
contract renegotiation might begin immediately after inception of operations and 
where there is a marked asymmetry of resources between private operators, and 
particularly so large MNCs, and local authorities. This extends beyond the asymmetry 
of information on the operations, which has been addressed by regulatory theory, and 
includes asymmetry of resources such as access to legal resources, economic clout 
and knowledge of the sector. In both Arezzo and Milan, such asymmetry resulted in 
failure to achieve intended objectives such as efficiency and in MNCs effectively 
controlling the process of reform. In Milan, the experience with wastewater treatment 
BOTs informed the municipal government’s decision not to resort to competitive 
tendering for the selection of the water supply and sewerage operator. 
The natural monopoly characteristics of water services, and the ensuing asymmetry of 
information and resources between operators and regulators, provide ample 
opportunities for private concessionaires to escape competitive pressure and indulge 
in interest-seeking practices. Competition for the market thus appears as unsuitable to 
achieving intended governance and reform objectives such as efficiency and 
effectiveness. This calls for abandoning the emphasis on competitive tendering as the 
primary instrument for the selection of water operators. It also calls for exploring 
alternative governance strategies in the pursuit of sustainability. A body of literature 
emphasises the merits of in-house operations as opposed to PSP, irrespective of 
whether the private operator is selected through competitive tendering (Lobina and 
Hall, 2007). For the purposes of this exercise, we contend that efforts to enhance 
accountability networks via greater transparency and public participation represent a 
more promising approach to sectoral regulation than the current reliance on Demsetz 
competition and the associated regulation by contract. 
The argument in favour of strengthening governance via transparency, accountability 
and public participation equally applies to private and public operations. Lobina and 
Hall (2007) argue that local authorities’ fiscal considerations might provide incentives 
for establishing cooperative relationships with private operators to the detriment of 
sustainability objectives and that this calls for the introduction of greater transparency, 
possibly via advanced forms of public participation. This seems to be required also 
under public operations, as suggested by the case of Milan in relation to water supply 
and sanitation. Greater transparency and public participation have the potential to 
reduce asymmetry of information and power, enhancing the effectiveness of 
regulation and the alignment of the operator’s interests with the intended governance 
objectives.                 
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7.3. Inadequacy of current EU law to promote transparency and public participation 
in the water sector  
The Aarhaus Convention (Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation 
in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters) represents one 
of the most important initiatives to promote transparency and public participation in 
environmental matters. It provides for rights to the public in three specific areas: a) 
the right to have access to information on the environment held by government 
authorities; b) the right to participate in the decisions taken by these authorities that 
affect the environment; and, c) the right to review and legally challenge such 
decisions. 
These three “pillars” of the Aarhus Convention were adopted by the European Union 
in 2003 through two directives (Directive 2003/4/EC on public access to 
environmental information and Directive 2003/35/EC providing for public 
participation in environmental plans and programmes). Both directives contain 
provisions on access to justice, the third pillar. 
Nonetheless, current EU law fails to provide for public rights to seek and obtain 
information on the accounts of water service operators, nor for the right to participate 
in decisions on the reform of water services and the appointment of water operators. 
Lobina (2005b: 22) explains the limited resort to public participation in the case of 
Arezzo with the failure by national and regional legislation to require local authorities 
to engage in advanced participatory exercises, that is to say beyond sporadic 
consultation. 
Lobina and Paccagnan (2005: 17) address the fact that the decision making process on 
the reform of water supply and sanitation services in Milan was characterised by little 
if any public participation. They refer to the reluctance of local authorities as an 
obstacle to the introduction of effective forms of public participation (compounded by 
the historical absence of a participatory culture in Italy, see Lobina, 2005a: pp. 22-
23). In that sense, it should be noted that the 1998 regional law implementing the 
Galli Law is silent on public participation71, while the December 2003 regional law 
provides for Lombardy’s regional government to promote public participation in 
water resources management, but not in water supply and operations72. 
In the absence of specific requirements enshrined in EU and national laws, it is 
extremely unlikely that meaningful mechanisms of transparency, accountability and 
public participation be introduced at local level. Failure to provide for specific legal 
requirements for local authorities to act in that sense is an impediment to the 
strengthening of water service governance in Europe.   
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